Logic of Reality: Deriving the Experientio
§1: what is the experientio?
one of the most famous (or infamous) conclusions in the history of psychophilosophy is Descartes' cogito: I think; therefore, I am.
elsewhere on this site, I2 have concluded that many people fail to realize that Descartes defined 'thinking' as we, today, might define 'experiencing'; and, that Descartes erroneously defined 'amness' as eqivalent to 'existence' --- so that 'I am' == 'I exist' is true. in order to correct this popular misconception and to correct Descartes' mistake(s), I2 propose to recast the cogito as the experientio: I2 experience; therefore, I2 am.
what follows is the derivation of the experientio from the obvious fact that I2 experience using the logic of reality which, for the convenience of the reader, is presented from the ground up; but, with abbreviated comments. please see the foundation page for a more detailed commentary on the first few steps
§2: up from the foundation
there is a predicate, A; such that, for any x that is, x is A.
this is Axiom 0. it simply means that there is a root predicate attributable to all that is.
where R = 'real (in some sense)' ≡ 'real'.
translation: for any x that is, x is real (in some sense).
substituting an actual predicate for 'A' in Axiom 0 creates a substitution instance of Axiom 0: Axiom 1 of the logic of reality, the substitution predicate is 'real' or, equivalently, 'real (in some sense)'.
where -R = 'unreal' or 'not real (in any sense)'
translation: it is not the case that there is an x such that x is unreal.
(3) is logically equivalent to (2) above.
definitions for Reality/reality and unreality.
where S = 'self-aware'
First Law of Reality: Nothing unreal is self-aware
clearly, if it is not the case that there is something which is not real in any sense of the word 'real'; then, a fortiori, it is not the case that there is something which is not real in any sense of the word 'real' and is self-aware.
translation: for any x, if x is self-aware then x is real (in some sense).
(5) is logically equivalent to (4); but, stated as a universal affirmative proposition.
where i = I2, this experiencer or this instance of phenomenal awareness.
translation: if I2 am self-aware; then, I2 am real in some sense.
this is the instantiated form of the previous statement. normally, in the predicate calculus, instantiated forms use 'a', 'b' and 'c' as constants; but, in the context of first-person useage, I2 see no point in not using 'i' as a constant.
now, in order to use the conclusion reached so far, I2 need only establish that I2 am self-aware. then, by simple modus ponens, I2 can conclude that I2 am real in some sense.
§3: the derivation of the experientio
this is an undeniable fact. at this very moment you are experiencing reading this sentence. at some other moment you may be experiencing something else.
from my point of view, I2 say 'I2 am this which experiences' and you, from your point of view could also say 'I2 am this which experiences'. how could you deny experiencing without experiencing your own assertion of that denial?
I2 use the word 'I2' for the purpose of self-referencing. I2 am well aware of having *intended* to self-reference; and, if experience is any guide, I2 have succeed in that attempt. I know exactly who wrote statement (8) above.
in constructions like 'self-aware', the word 'self' is used as an indexical/anaphoric pronoun. thus, it takes as its referent the referent of a previous term in the discourse --- in this case, the referent of 'I2'. It does not imply awareness of self-3 (the great Jungian archetype or the great Soul/Self from eastern philosophies); and, it doesn't imply awareness of self-1 (the body, or some part thereof); but, neither does it rule out those conclusions --- if additional evidence is presented.
my attempt to disambiguate the useage of 'self'.
this follows from (5) and (9) by modus ponens.
This is taken as the definition of is/am.
Reality (the collective/mass noun when capitalized) may be defined as the totality of that which is. the particular noun, *a* reality, is some 'piece' of the totality. Thus, to say of X that it is, is to to say that X is real (in some sense). To say of I2, that I2 am, is to say that I2 am real (in some sense).
Conclusion produced by concatenating (6) and (12).
§4: moving on
interesting and important questions remain even after deriving the experientio:
- what am I2, this I2 that I2 now know is real?
- what is the reality type of this I2 that I2 now know is real?
- what is the origin of this I2 that I2 now know is real?
§4.1: what am I2, this I2 that I2 now know is real?
as described elsewhere, I2 conclude that I2 am an experiencer; and, hence:
by saying this experiencer or an experiencer, I2 indicate that I2 have no interest in disproving the possibility of solipsism. I2 simply accept as true that other humans (and, possibly, some animals) have the same structure as I2 do: a phenomenological experiencer and its associated body. when saying an experiencer or the experiencer, I2 am saying something applicable to any I2 not just this I2.
§4.2: what is the reality type of this I2 that I2 now know is real?
as described elsewhere, I2 conclude that I2 am a phenomenological reality; and, hence:
§4.3: what is the origin of this I2 that I2 now know is real?
this question brings me to the threshold of relative psychophilosophy. I2 do not know my origin; and, hence:
the question of the origin of the I2 is taken up in my third meditation.