Logic of Reality: Taxonomy of All that (allegedly) Is
to review, in the logic of reality, there is:
this may also be treated as an inference. clearly, an afterimage is a phenomenological reality, a real experience; and, a rock is a physical reality; but, it seems foolish to say that an afterimage is real in the same sense that a rock is real.
the senses of the word 'real' correspond to the various reality types.
as used in these definitions, a sense of the word 'real' corresponds to a reality type, of which the following are presently recognized:
- 1. existential realities - include anything composed of matter/energy, space/time or any combination thereof; and, includes both actual and virtual particles.
- 2. phenomenological realities - include experienced (eg. afterimages) and experiencing realities (eg. experiencers of afterimages).
- 3. ontological realities - a non-existential reality independent of the experience the I2 has of it; possibilities include universal concepts (when thought to be real apart from the things which instantiate them), mathematical objects (when thought to be real apart from the mathematician's experience of them) and spiritual/mental beings or entities (such as individual minds or the collective Mind or self/Self, souls, Spirit etc.).
reality types are numbered to reduce the ambiguity inherent in a natural language when a word, particularly a noun or pronoun, can be used to refer to realities (or alleged realities) of more than one type. in such cases, humanese requires that the type-ambiguous word be subscripted to indicate the reality type of its referent.
for first person useage in humanese english, the referent-ambiguous 'I' of vernacular english is subscripted by reality type. see symbology for greater detail.
§1: the taxonomy of realities
a taxonomy is a hierarchical structure used to classify into subtypes those objects to which its root predicate may be attributed.
§1.1: the root predicate
in the taxonomy of living things, the root predicate is organism or a living thing. if one can say of x that 'x is an organism'; then, x must have a place within the taxonomy. in the case of the taxonomy of living things, organisms are classified into subtypes: kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, species, and subspecies.
in the taxonomy of realities, the root predicate is 'real' or 'a reality'; and, hence, if one may say of x that 'x is real' or 'x is a reality', then x must have a place within the taxonomy of realities.
in the logic of reality, 'real' is the root predicate; but, is it a property?
I2 accept 'real' as a legitimate predicate; but, one which specifies nothing about the referent of the object of predication beyond the fact that it is; for, saying that X is real (in some sense) means no more than saying that X is (in some sense). in contrast, a property of X does more than imply that X is. it contributes to my understanding of what X is.
calling reality a property would blur this difference between knowing that X is and knowing what X is; and, would also blur the difference between the property of 'reality' and the reality that 'has' the property of 'reality'. for these reasons, I2 conclude that 'reality' is a predicate but not a property.
§1.1.2: the names of subtypes
in the taxonomy of living things, it is important to note that the names of the subtypes (kingdoms, phyla, families, etc.) of the classification scheme are also predicates but not properties. one can not look at a sample organism thru a microscope and observe that its phylum property has the value of 'flightless bird'. the names of the classes into which organisms are classified are arbitrary names. the act of classification is based on the other properties of the organism.
similarly, the names of the reality types are legitmate predicates. they are the names of the classes or sets into which I2 classify the various realities I2 encounter; and, hence, these predicates are or may be properties of the classification scheme; but, they are not properties of the realities that are classified by the taxonomy.
even if one considered these predicates as properties, I2 would nevertheless classify realities into reality types by evaluating their other properties.
nevertheless, a report about an act of classification can convey useful knowledge. a traveler returning to europe from australia might say 'black swans exist' and convey useful information --- that the conception of 'black swan' as a phenomenological reality is now known to have an existential correlate. the identification of these creatures as black swans, however, is done by examining the properties of the creature.
since I2 can not attribute properties to an unreality, it follows that:
this axiom has been called the instantiation principle: if it has a property then it has to be real (in some sense).
§1.1.3: other predicates
even when it is clear that a predicate is a property, it is not always clear whether it's a property of the object or of the subject.
for example, when physicists say that a black hole has only three properties --- mass, electric charge and angular momentum --- a philosopher naturally concludes that the black hole also has the property of having only three properties; and, of course, this makes four properties and creates a logical paradox for the philosopher to write about. 'has only three properties' is a predicate; but, is it a property of the object or of the subject? I2 prefer the latter conclusion because it indicates that the subject has knowledge beyond the facts upon which the detection of each individual property is based.
since an unreality is no more than the absence of any reality, it follows that unreality is not itself a reality type.
could a reality have no properties? if so, I2 would have no basis for attributing a reality type; so, this begs the question: is it possible to have a reality that has no reality type? it would be deeply paradoxical to answer 'yes'; for, such a claim would effectively attribute the reality type of 'untypeable reality' to the reality in question. thus:
this doesn't mean that I2 automagically know the reality type of every reality that I2 accept as such. in my own case, there was a significant period of time between accepting that I2 am a reality and deciding that I2 am an experiencing reality. even now, I2 do not know what reality type to attribute to the reality or realities from which I2 originate; and, it is possible that I2 may not ever know. the conclusion is inescapable:
of course, there is no guarantee that I2 will eventually discover the reality type of a given reality. in some cases, hard work and careful thought may overcome a transient ignorance; but, I2 may suffer from some limitation, whether peculiar to I2 or common to any I2, which prevents me from discovering enough about a given reality to discern its type.